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Hack: The Marketplace of Twitter

THE MARKETPLACE OF TWITTER: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE
PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
Elijah Hack

I. INTRODUCTION
From before the United States’ inception, the nation’s leaders and
thinkers placed high value on the protection of speech. The framers’
believed that by permitting uninhibited political discourse, the best ideas
would emerge and be refined so that truth could prevail. In his book On
Liberty, John Stuart Mill summarized this belief in a doctrine that has
come to be known as the “marketplace of ideas.”1 Mill believed that
human beings ought to be free to make their own judgements on ideas,
not have ideas and opinions filtered through government.2 He believed
that ideas can be fully discussed and matured through debate in the
marketplace.3 Mill believed that ideas evolved in conflict, so that the best
parts of divergent ideas contributed to a whole truth.4
Additionally, Mill believed that when opinion is silenced, humanity
suffers: “The peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is,
that it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than those who
hold it . . . .”5 Mill believed that when government extinguishes opinions
before they reach the marketplace, free individuals are unable to make
their own judgements in seeking truth.6 True opinions, however, are
resilient according to Mill: “[The] real advantage which truth has [is] that
when an opinion is true it may be extinguished once, twice, or many
times, but in the course of ages there will generally be found persons to
rediscover it, until [eventually] it has made such head as to withstand all
subsequent attempts to suppress it . . .”7
Moreover, Mill believed that ideas could be fully and freely articulated
until they developed to truth through the marketplace. Even if an opinion

1. It must be noted that the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor was never coined in On Liberty, and
scholars debate whether it properly portrayed Mill’s liberalism or his philosophy on free speech. See Jill
Gordon, John Stuart Mill and the ‘Marketplace of Ideas,’ 23 SOCIAL THEORY AND PRACTICE, 235, 235249, (1997), https://www.jstor.org/stable/23559183 [https://perma.cc/UDK4-KP3D].
2. See GEOFFERY R. STONE, LOUIS M. SEIDMAN, CASS R. SUNSTEIN, & MARK V. TUSHNET,
Constitutional Law, (4th ed., 2001), 998-999.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in Geoffery R. Stone, Louis M. Seidman, Cass R. Sunstein, and
Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Law, (Fourth Edition, 2001) (Casebook Author’s emphasis).
6. See id.
7. Id.
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was true, Mill believed the test of the marketplace added invaluable
opportunity: “[However true an opinion] may be, if it is not fully,
frequently, and fearlessly discussed it will be held as a dead dogma, not a
living truth.”8 Knowledge and appreciation of all sides of an issue, Mill
theorized, is essential to the truth-seeking function of free speech: “[He]
who knows only his own side of the case knows little of that. [Even if]
the received opinion [is] true, a conflict with the opposite error is essential
to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth . . . .”9
Further, Mill believed that conflicting opinions are valuable in the
construction of a whole truth. “[T]he conflicting doctrines, instead of
being one true and the other false, [may] share the truth between them;
and the nonconforming opinion [may be] needed to supply the remainder
of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part.”10
According to Mill, all opinions are necessary in the marketplace in order
to provide nuance and find truth: “[Every] opinion which embodies
somewhat of the portion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought
to be considered precious.”11
Mill likely did not envision the state of truth and speech in 2019. His
ideas, however, resonate in the era of “fake news” and partisan
reporting.12 In July 2016, a Pew Research study showed that seventy-four
percent of Americans believe that the news media is biased in their
coverage of politics and social issues.13 The distrust of media is
particularly alarming given the current polarization of Americans in their
news consumption; a 2014 Pew Research study found that consistent
liberal and conservative Americans are likely to receive their news from
likeminded sources.14 The poll shows that consistent liberals and
conservatives are more likely to trust likeminded news sources as opposed
to those expressing views which conflict with or challenge their own.15
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. “Fake News” is a term popularized by President Donald Trump used to refer to news sources
or stories he believes mislead the public or are incorrect.
13. Amy Mitchell, Jeffery Gottfired, Michael Barthel, & Elisa Shearer, The Modern News
Consumer, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (July 7, 2016) http://www.journalism.org/2016/07/07/trust-andaccuracy/ [https://perma.cc/M5EP-CAVG].
14. Amy Mitchell, Jeffery, Gottfried, Jocelyn Kiley, & Katerina Eva Masta, Political Polarization
RESEARCH
CENTER,
(October
21,
2014)
&
Media
Habits,
PEW
http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/
[https://perma.cc/7RKUV9K6]; In particular the research shows that 47% of consistent conservatives receive their political news
from Fox News, while consistent liberals name CNN (15%), NPR (13%), MSNBC (12%), and the New
York Times (10%) as their main sources for political news.
15. Id. The poll found that 88% of consistently conservative individuals trust Fox News, while
consistent liberals are more likely to trust public news sources like NPR (72%), PBS (71%) and BBC
(69%).
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In this era of siloed news, social media has come to occupy a
particularly interesting role in exposing individuals to conflicting ideas.
More than sixty-nine percent of Americans use social media. and only
twenty-three percent say that the political posts they see on Facebook are
in line with their own views.16 In particular, Twitter CEO Jack Dorsey
expressed the site’s commitment to neutrality in his testimony before the
House Energy and Commerce Committee amid claims that Twitter had
an anti-conservative bias.17 Dorsey claimed that “[W]e don’t consider
political viewpoints, perspectives, or party affiliation in any of our
policies or enforcement decisions . . . [i]mpartiality is our guiding
principle.”18 Dorsey believed that Twitter occupies an important role in
the shaping of political discourse. Dorsey tweeted:
We believe many people use Twitter as a digital public square. They gather
from around the world to see what’s happening and have a conversation
about what they see. Twitter cannot rightly serve as a public square if it’s
constructed around the personal opinions of its makers. We believe a key
driver a thriving public square is the fundamental human right of freedom
of opinion and expression. Our early and strong defense of open and free
exchange as enabled Twitter to be THE platform for activists, marginalized
communities, whistleblowers, journalists, governments and the most
influential people around the world. Twitter will always default to open
and free exchange.19

Dorsey’s idyllic perception of the role of his company in the
marketplace of ideas reflects the enduring power and popular assumption
of Mill’s philosophy. Like the theoretical marketplace of ideas envisioned
by Mill, it seems Dorsey believes Twitter’s space in the larger community
of political discourse is crucial because of its impartiality and openness.
Implicit in Dorsey remarks is the importance of the space in which
speech takes place. The Supreme Court has interpreted the First
Amendment to protect speech on government property historically used
for public expression. 20 The so-called “public forum” doctrine protects
speech in places which have been traditionally devoted to public debate.21
The application of the public forum doctrine has typically been a
16. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, (February 8, 2018).
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/2G4U-FDM4 ], (finding that
numbers of social media users are particularly high for young adults- 88% for ages 18-29); Political
Polarization & Media Habits, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/politicalpolarization-media-habits/ [https://perma.cc/SS69-TNU6]
17. Jack
Dorsey,
@jack,
(September
5,
2018,
12:31
pm),
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1037422913819959298 [https://perma.cc/SM3J-GML6].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992), [hereinafter ISKCON].
21. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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historical exercise—consisting of an analysis of the history of using a
particular space, or category of spaces, for communicative purposes.22
However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the doctrine to expand
beyond spatial limitations.23 While the Supreme Court has not discussed
whether to doctrine expands to social media, the rapid expansion of the
internet and online forums like Twitter and Facebook demands that the
traditional notions of forums and speech must evolve in order to properly
protect political speech.
As Dorsey mentions, Twitter has become the platform for political
leaders.24 Two of these leaders are United States President Donald Trump
and Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin, who frequently use Twitter and
Facebook as a means of communicating with their constituents. Both
Bevin and Trump have been sued for “blocking” users on Twitter who
replied to their tweets with unfavorable opinions.25 This article will
explore the two lawsuits, their conflicting opinions, and what these
opinions mean for the evolution of speech in the internet age. Part II will
explore the history of the public forum doctrine, the government speech
doctrine, and the competing approaches of Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy in ISKCON v. Lee.26 Part III will outline the reasoning of the
district courts in the Hargis v. Bevin and Knight First Amendment Institute
at Columbia University v. Trump cases.27 Part IV will apply Justice
Rehnquist’s categorical analysis to find that the interactive spaces of
Twitter and Facebook should constitute a designated public forum. Part
V will apply Justice Kennedy’s analysis and advocate for its adoption
because of its flexibility and focus on the actual uses of forums as opposed
to their historical attributes.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to properly analyze the importance of social media in today’s
marketplace, it is crucial to understand the history of the various doctrines
that have played a role in American free speech doctrine over the nation’s
22. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 672.
23. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 830 (1995),
[hereinafter Rosenberger].
24. See Dorsey, supra note 17.
25. See Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), [hereinafter Trump]; When a user
“blocks” another user on Twitter, the “blocked” user is unable to view anything on the page of the blocking
user, including any posts of the blocking user or any replies to those posts. A Facebook page differs from
a profile in that it is public to other Facebook users. The administrator of a particular page may “ban”
users from the page which will still allow them to view posts on the page, but a banned user is unable to
comment or post on the banning user’s page.
26. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678, 694.
27. See Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1003; Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 541.
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history. This Part provides this needed background. First, section A will
explore the evolution of the categorical approach to the public forum
doctrine. Next, section B will discuss the divergent approaches of Chief
Justice Rehnquist’s categorical analysis and Justice Kennedy’s more case
specific approach that have been presented by the justice in various
Supreme Court opinions. Finally, section C will outline the government
speech doctrine which becomes relevant when speakers are government
actors.
A. Categories of Government Property
In analyzing speech on government property, the Supreme Court has
adopted a categorical analysis, first defining the nature of the property and
then deciding whether a limitation on speech is permissible.28 Justice
White introduced this categorical approach to speech regulations on
government property in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators Association, differentiating between (1) traditional or
quintessential public fora, (2) designated public fora, and (3) nonpublic
fora.29
The first category of public fora is the traditional public forum.
Traditional public fora, according to Perry, are places “which by long
tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate
. . . .”30 The Court recognizes that traditional public fora include streets,
parks, and other things “immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the
public and [that], time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions.”31 Past Supreme Court cases have shown the Court’s
propensity to limit the application of the traditional public forum
designation, but the Court does afford traditional public fora the
protection of strict scrutiny due to their historical and political
importance.32 In this context, strict scrutiny means that time, place,
manner, and content-neutral restrictions on speech are permissible in a
traditional public forum only when they are narrowly tailored to achieve
a significant governmental interest and leave open alternative
communicative channels.33 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
28. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983).
29. Id. at 45-46.
30. Id. at 45.
31. Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
32. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992),
33. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; Professor A. Chris Bryant, University of Cincinnati Rufus King
Professor of Constitutional Law, introduced a test for whether a speech restriction is content-based or
content-neutral. Referencing “The Andy Griffith Show,” Professor Bryant suggested the following
“Mayberry” test: Suppose Barney Fife were to come into Sheriff Andy Taylor’s office and proclaim,
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Education Fund, the Court established that “[b]ecause a principal purpose
of traditional public fora is the free exchange of ideas, speakers can be
excluded from a public forum only when the exclusion is necessary.”34
Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization was the first instance
in which the Court introduced these special protections for government
property that have traditionally been used as a means of discourse.35
Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges and immunities clause and
Due Process clause, the Hague Court invalidated a city ordinance
prohibiting street meetings and public assembly.36 The Court held that
certain special protections are afforded to streets and parks due to their
role as a medium for public discourse.37 “Such use of the streets and
public places has, from ancient times been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.” The Court concluded that the
special role of streets and parks in the tradition of public discussion means
that such spaces are subject to a higher level of scrutiny when speech is
regulated or denied.38
The second category of fora is a designated public forum. Designated
public fora, also known as limited-purpose public fora, come into
existence when the government intentionally opens its property for public
discourse.39 Designated public fora differ from traditional public fora in
that their existence depends more on the intention of government than the
historical significance of a particular space.40 According to Cornelius,
“the government does not create a public forum by inaction or by
permitting limited discourse but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse.”41 Once government decides to
use its property in a way that creates a designated public forum, “[t]he
Constitution forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum…
even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.”42
Designated public fora are not limited by the same spatial or geographic
bounds of a traditional public forum.43 For example, the Court has
employed the designated public forum analysis to the funding of printing
“Andy, there are troublemakers handing out pamphlets on the courthouse lawn.” If Andy Taylor responds,
“Pamphlets on the courthouse lawn? That is not allowed!” then the restriction is likely content-neutral. If
Andy Taylor instead were to respond, “What did the pamphlets say, Barney?” before deciding whether to
act, then it is likely that the restriction is content-based. THE ANDY GRIFFITH SHOW, CBS (1961).
34. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
35. See Hague, 307 U.S. at 515-516.
36. See id. at 516.
37. Id. at 515.
38. Id.
39. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992),
40. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
41. Id.
42. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
43. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830.
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student publications at a public university.44 The government may set
limits on designated public fora to exclude a class of speech, also known
as content-discrimination, in order to preserve the forum for the purpose
for which it was created.45 However, viewpoint-discrimination, which is
regulation that excludes speech due to its particular opinion or perspective
on a subject matter, is impermissible within a designated public forum
just like it is impermissible in a traditional public forum.46
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia, the
Court found that the University’s refusal to fund the publication of Wide
Awake Productions, a student-run, Christian newspaper, was
impermissible viewpoint discrimination.47 The Court found that the
University, through its student activity fund, “[did] not exclude religion
as a subject matter, but select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student
journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.”48 The prohibition
of a “specific premise, perspective or standpoint,” was not a permissible
content-based restriction for the preservation of the forum, but instead
amounted to impermissible viewpoint-discrimination according to the
Court.49
A third category of government property is nonpublic fora. Private
individuals are not guaranteed access to government property for speech
purposes simply because the property is owned or controlled by
government.50 If government property does not fall within the limited
scope of a traditional public forum or if the government does not
intentionally open the space for public discourse, then the property is
outside the scope of forum analysis.51 In a nonpublic forum, the
government “may reserve the forum for its intended purposes,
communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public
officials oppose the speaker’s point of view.”52 If the intended purposes
of the government property are not compatible with expressive activity,
then the government, like any property owner, is not required to allow
expressive activity.53
The Supreme Court applied the nonpublic forum analysis to an

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 829-830.
Id. at 830.
Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981).
Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
Id.
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 819 (1985).
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interschool mailing system in Perry.54 The Court found that because the
“normal and intended function of the school mail facilities is to facilitate
internal communication of school-related matters to teachers,” the
mailing system was not a public forum under the First Amendment.55 The
Perry School District did not open its mail system to the general public
for communicative purposes and, therefore, did not create a public
forum.56 Consequently, to allow indiscriminate access to the mail system
would frustrate the intended purposes of the property; therefore, the Court
held that the restrictions on access were permissible under the First
Amendment.57
B. Competing Approaches to Public Forum Doctrine in ISKCON v. Lee
The Court’s use of a categorical approach in application of the public
forum doctrine has resulted in a static, unresponsive doctrine heavily
focused on an inflexible and literal interpretation of fora and speech and
a lack of sensitivity to the values of the First Amendment.58 But the
doctrine has not developed without serious opposition within the Court.59
This disagreement was first introduced in ISKCON v. Lee. The plaintiffs
in ISKCON, a Krishna religious group, sued the police superintendent
seeking an injunction to a regulation limiting solicitation within an airport
terminal.60 The group argued that the regulation violated the right to free
speech in a forum context.61 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion
and Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion best display the disagreement
between members of the Court.62 Rehnquist’s opinion best exemplifies
the governing categorical approach, while Kennedy’s opinion offers an
alternative case-by-case approach to public forum doctrine.63
Rehnquist’s approach strictly followed the categorical method
developed in Perry, Cornelius, and subsequent cases.64 Rehnquist first
54. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
55. Id. at 47-48; However, it is important to note that the mailing system was opened to select
private organizations such as the Cub Scouts, YMCA’s, and parochial schools. The Court conceded that
such action did create a forum, but even if it did, the forum analysis was only applicable to other similar
groups, such as the Girl Scouts or other similar organizations.
56. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
57. See id. at 49.
58. See Lillian R. BeVier Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense of Categories.
1992 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW, 79-122, 81-82 (1992), www.jstor.org/stable/3109668
[https://perma.cc/9GND-DD7C].
59. Id. at 96.
60. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 674 (1992).
61. Id.
62. See BeVier supra note 58, at 96-99.
63. Id.
64. See ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 678-679.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss1/9

8

Hack: The Marketplace of Twitter

2019]

THE MARKETPLACE OF TWITTER

321

dismissed any notion that airport terminals could be considered a
traditional public forum citing Hague—“[G]iven the lateness with which
the modern air terminal has made its appearance, it hardly qualifies for
the description of having ‘immemorially . . . time out of mind’ been held
in the public trust and used for purposes of expressive activity.”65 Because
airports, and particularly the use of airports as a forum for the distribution
of religious material, is a recent phenomenon, Rehnquist argued that the
practice does not “demonstrate that airports have historically been made
available for speech activity.”66 Likewise, Rehnquist rejected the
argument that airport terminals would qualify as a designated public
forum because they were not “internationally opened by their operators
to such activity.”67 According to Rehnquist, airports are a nonpublic
forum—they are government property opened for “the purpose of . . .
facilitat[ing] air travel, not the promotion of expression.”68 After reaching
this conclusion, the Court specified that speech restrictions in any
nonpublic forum need to only meet the reasonableness standard of the
Court and are not subject to strict scrutiny.69 Rehnquist explained that due
to “the disruptive effect that solicitation may have on business,” the
regulation is reasonable.70
Kennedy began his concurring opinion by challenging the established
categorical analysis of the public forum doctrine. Kennedy claimed it
“ought not be a jurisprudence of categories rather than ideas or convert
what was once an analysis protective of expression into one which grants
the government authority to restrict speech by fiat.”71 According to
Kennedy, under the categorical method, government is free to restrict
speech on its property so long as it articulates a non-speech-related
purpose for the area.72 This makes it nearly impossible for the
development of new public forums, Kennedy argued.73 Kennedy claimed
that under the Court’s categorical forum analysis, “in almost all cases the
critical step in the Court’s analysis is a classification of the property that
turns on the government’s own definition or decision, unconstrained by
an independent duty to respect the speech its citizens can voice there.”74
In regards to traditional public fora, Kennedy argued that “[t]he Court’s

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 680 (quoting Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 682.
Id. at 683.
Id.
Id. at 694.
Id. at 695.
Id.
Id.
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analysis rests on an inaccurate view of history.”75 Kennedy argued that
even the most basic of recognized traditional public fora have a principal
purpose other than speech.76 “It would seem apparent,” Kennedy stated,
“that the principal purpose of streets and sidewalks, like airports, is to
facilitate transportation, not public discourse, and we have recognized as
much.”77 Kennedy urged the Court to reconsider the First Amendment as
“a limitation on government, not a grant of power.”78
As an alternative, Kennedy offered a new standard to judge public
fora—“[i]f the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue
and the actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the
government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and
compatible with those uses, the property is a public forum.”79 Kennedy
suggests that the proper method would be to analyze
whether the property shares physical similarities with more traditional
public forums, whether the government has permitted or acquiesced in
broad public access to the property, and whether expressive activity would
tend to interfere in a significant way with the uses to which the government
has . . . dedicated the property.”80

In response to the category of designated public fora, Kennedy
conceded that “government always retains authority to close a public
forum, by selling the property, changing its physical character, or
changing its principal use.”81
Applying his own standard to the case at bar, Kennedy concluded that
“it is evident that the public spaces of the Port Authority’s airports are
public forums.”82 Kennedy found that the airport terminals were
physically similar to streets in that they were “broad, public thoroughfares
full of people and lined with stores and other commercial activities.”83
Second, Kennedy cited that the areas are open to the public and frequently
used by over 78 million passengers per year.84 “It is the very breadth and
extent of the public’s use of airports that makes it imperative to protect
speech rights there,” he argued.85 Third, Kennedy found that any
disruptive effect speech could have on the airport’s primary purpose can

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Id. at 696.
See id.
Id. at 696-697.
Id. at 695.
Id. at 698.
Id. at 699-700.
Id.
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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be curtailed with adequate time, place, and manner restrictions without
limiting expression.86 “The Authority has for many years permitted
expressive activities by the petitioners and others,” Kennedy wrote,
“without any apparent interference with its ability to meet its
transportation purposes.”87 Applying this somewhat novel approach to the
forum doctrine, Kennedy found that the restriction on the distribution of
materials in the airport was overbroad and did not survive the Court’s
strict scrutiny on restrictions of speech.88 However, he concluded that the
ban on solicitation of funds survived the test as “either a reasonable time,
place, and manner restriction, or as a regulation directed at the nonspeech
element of expressive conduct.”89
Kennedy believed the public forum doctrine left “almost no scope for
the development of new public forums” and would lead to a “serious
curtailment of our expressive activity.”90 Despite Kennedy’s proposal,
Rehnquist’s application of the categorical reasoning of Perry is followed
by lower courts today.91 While certainly inflexible, the public forum
doctrine provides district courts with a workable standard for judging
speech rights on government property.92
C. Government Speech Doctrine
While the First Amendment prohibits government from restricting the
speech of private individuals, the prohibition does not apply when
government speaks for itself.93 Two cases, Pleasant Grove v. Summum
and Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.,
summarize the government speech doctrine.94
In Pleasant Grove, a unanimous Supreme Court found that in a public
forum, government may limit expressive activity when it is determined
that the government is speaking for itself and is not limiting the speech of
others.95 In Pleasant Grove, a religious organization requested that the
City of Pleasant Grove erect a donated monument containing “the Seven
Aphorisms of SUMMUM,” the major tenets of their religion which are

86. See id. at 701.
87. Id.
88. See id. at 703.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 695, 698.
91. See Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018); Knight First Amendment Inst. at
Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
92. See BeVier, supra note 58, at 121.
93. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009).
94. Id. at 460; Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015).
95. Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 464.
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similar to Ten Commandments.96 The park already contained eleven other
donated permanent structures including a Ten Commandments
monument and a September 11th monument.97 The city denied the request.
The Court held that the city was able to deny the request without violating
the First Amendment because the erection amounted to government
speech, not the restriction of private speech.98 “The Free Speech Clause,”
the Court wrote, “restricts government regulation of private speech; it
does not regulate government speech.”99 Government has the right to
speak and may select which views that it wants to express.100 The Court
admitted that while in some cases it may be difficult to determine whether
or not the government was the speaker, the erection of a permanent
monument clearly fell within the realm of government speech.101
Walker presented the Court with exactly the problem that was
previously foreshadowed in Pleasant Grove. In a 5-4 decision written by
Justice Breyer, the Court determined that Texas did not violate the First
Amendment by not permitting the Sons of Confederate Veterans to create
and use a specialty license plate featuring a Confederate flag.102 The Court
interpreted Pleasant Grove to create a three-part test that it used to
determine that the specialty license plate was government speech—(1)
whether there is a history of government using a medium to convey
government speech, (2) whether the speech is “often closely identified in
the public mind” with the government, and (3) whether government
maintains direct control over the messages conveyed.103 Applying this test
to the specialty license plate program, the Court found, first, that States
have a long history of using license plates to convey government speech
such as “slogans urging action, promoting tourism and touting local
industries.”104 Second, the Court found that Texas license plates are
closely identified with government because the plate was a government
identification article and contained the name of the state – “TEXAS.”105
Third, the Court found that because Texas Motor Vehicles Board
approved each design, they effectively controlled the messages conveyed
on the license plates.106
96. Id. at 465.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 467.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 467-468.
101. Id. at 470.
102. Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2241 (2015).
103. Id. at 2242 (quoting Pleasant Grove, 555 U.S. at 472).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.; Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion seemed to scoff at the idea that the specialty license
plates could be government speech, and offered the following anecdote to prove the absurdity:
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III. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A PUBLIC FORUM
Public officials’ use of social media presents an interesting
Constitutional question under the public forum and government speech
analyses. Two conflicting cases, Hargis v. Bevin,107 and Knight First
Amendment Institute at Columbia University v. Trump,108 illustrate a
current circuit split considering whether a public official violates the First
Amendment by “blocking” an individual from commenting on the public
official’s social media account. In Section A, this Article analyzes the
Bevin case and demonstrates how the Bevin court found that a public
official’s use of social media is not subject to the forum analysis at all
because it consists of government speech, not private speech.109 In
Section B, this Article summarizes the Trump court’s use of Rehnquist’s
categorical approach to conclude that the interactive space on social
media was a designated public forum, not government speech.110
A. Hargis v. Bevin
In Bevin, Kentucky Governor Matt Bevin “blocked” plaintiff Drew
Morgan on Twitter after Morgan made comments regarding Bevin’s
overdue property taxes.111 Similarly, Bevin banned Mary Hargis from his

Here is a test. Suppose you sat by the side of a Texas highway and studied the license plates on
the vehicles passing by. You would see, in addition to the standard Texas plates, an impressive
array of specialty plates. (There are now more than 350 varieties.) You would likely observe plates
that honor numerous colleges and universities. You might see plates bearing the name of a high
school, a fraternity or sorority, the Masons, the Knights of Columbus, the Daughters of the
American Revolution, a realty company, a favorite soft drink, a favorite burger restaurant, and a
favorite NASCAR driver.
As you sat there watching these plates speed by, would you really think that the sentiments
reflected in these specialty plates are the views of the State of Texas and not those of the owners
of the cars? If a car with a plate that says “Rather Be Golfing” passed by at 8:30 am on a Monday
morning, would you think: “This is the official policy of the State—better to golf than to work?”
If you did your viewing at the start of the college football season and you saw Texas plates with
the names of the University of Texas’s out-of-state competitors in upcoming games—Notre Dame,
Oklahoma State, the University of Oklahoma, Kansas State, Iowa State—would you assume that
the State of Texas was officially (and perhaps treasonously) rooting for the Longhorns’ opponents?
And when a car zipped by with a plate that reads “NASCAR - 24 Jeff Gordon,” would you
think that Gordon (born in California, raised in Indiana, resides in North Carolina) is the official
favorite of the State government? Id. at 2255.
107. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
108. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y.
2018).
109. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1010.
110. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 549.
111. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d at 1006.
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Facebook page after Hargis criticized Bevin’s right-to-work policies.112
Hargis and Morgan sued for declaratory and injunctive relief in the
Eastern District of Kentucky asserting that Bevin’s actions on social
media violated their First Amendment rights.113
The district court first recognized that this “is a case of first impression
in the Sixth Circuit and, if appealed, would be a case of first impression
to the Supreme Court of the United States as well.”114 The Court
recognized the novel legal issue at bar and decided to exercise caution
when proceeding, heeding Justice Alito’s words to “‘proceed
circumspectly, taking one step at a time,’ when applying the Constitution
to social media.”115
The Court began by reflecting the positions of the parties: the plaintiffs
argued that Twitter and Facebook are traditional public fora, subject to
strict scrutiny for any content-based discrimination.116 Bevin countered
by arguing that Twitter and Facebook are limited fora, and that
restrictions of speech in this context were permissible because they were
viewpoint neutral and reasonable for the purpose of the forum.117 The
Court then proceeded to summarize Rehnquist’s categorical approach to
public forum doctrine.118
The Court, however, was unconvinced by both arguments, and
proceeded to analyze the claim under the government speech doctrine of
Walker.119 The Court noted that it “is convinced that Governor Bevin’s
use of privately owned Facebook and Twitter pages is personal speech,
and, because he is speaking on his own behalf, even on his own behalf as
a public official, ‘the First Amendment strictures that attend the various
types of government-established forums do not apply.’”120 The Court
asserted that “privately owned channels of communication,” such as
social media, “are not converted to public property by the use of a public
official.”121 If Governor Bevin had sought to open a forum to allow public
discourse, and allow everyone’s comments, he could have done so. But,
the Court argued, he did not set up his accounts to allow for such

112. Id.
113. Id. at 1008.
114. Id. at 1009.
115. Id. (quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1744 (2017) (Alito, J.,
concurring)).
116. Id. at 1010.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1010.
119. Id. at 1010-1011.
120. Id. at 1010-1011 (quoting Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct.
2239, 2250 (2015)).
121. Id. at 1011.
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commentary and “the First Amendment does not require him to do so.”122
The Court held that “Governor Bevin is under no obligation to listen to
Plaintiffs, and Plaintiffs have no Constitutional right to be heard in this
precise manner.”123 If Governor Bevin’s social media accounts were
susceptible to forum analysis, and he was unable to block constituents
from the accounts, “his accounts could be flooded with internet spam such
that the purpose of conveying his message to his constituents would be
impossible and the accounts would effectively, or actually, be closed.”124
Instead of working through Rehnquist’s categorical forum analysis, the
Court decided the government speech doctrine is applicable in this
case.125 Because Governor Bevin is speaking as the Governor, the Court
argued, he is “permitted to cull his desired message through his Facebook
and Twitter page . . . .” 126 Analogizing to Pleasant Grove and Walker, the
Court held that when the government speaks, it is not engaging in
viewpoint discrimination by preferring some speech over others.127 The
Court concluded that “Governor Bevin is not required to allow the public
to speak for him.”128
The Court ended its analysis of Bevin’s social media by proposing a
political, and not legal solution.129 In the end, the Governor, and all other
elected public officials are accountable to the public.130 In this case, “[t]he
public may view his Page and account if they wish and they may choose
to re-elect him or choose to elect someone else if they are unhappy with
how he administers his social media accounts.”131 The ballot box and not
the judicial system, the Court believed, is the proper mechanism for
plaintiffs to obtain relief.132
B. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump
In Trump, the Southern District of New York used Rehnquist’s
categorical approach to conclude that the interactive comment space
created when President Donald Trump posted to Twitter was a designated

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1011.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1012-1013.
Id.
Id. at 1012.
Id. at 1013.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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public forum.133
The Court began by explaining the interactive features of Twitter as a
social media platform, and specifically the President’s Twitter page
@realDonaldTrump and the plaintiffs’ relation to the account.134 The
Court explained that a “defining feature of Twitter” was a user’s ability
to interact with the posts or “tweets” of other Twitter users.135 Users are
able to repost or “retweet” another user’s tweet, “like” or “favorite”
another’s tweet, or “reply” to another user’s tweet.136 A user also has the
option to “mention” another user’s profile in a tweet of their own to make
reference to the other user.137 Once mentioned, the mentioned user will
receive a notification that they were mentioned by the mentioning user.138
In addition to all of the interactive features, the court recognized that
Twitter has two primary features meant to limit interaction—“blocking”
and “muting.”139 When a user blocks another user, the blocked user is
unable to view or interact with any of the blocking user’s tweets or view
their “followers” or “following” lists.140 The blocked user can still
mention the blocking user, but the blocking user will not receive a
notification nor be able to view the blocked user’s tweets.141 Muting, on
the other hand, does not prohibit a muted user from replying, retweeting,
or favoriting the muting user’s tweets.142 A muted user’s tweets are simply
not visible to the muting user, and the muted user does not receive any
sort of notification that they have been muted.143
The Court then turned its analysis to President Trump’s account and
recognized that “[s]ince his inauguration in January 2017, President
Trump has used @realDonaldTrump as a channel for communicating and
interacting with the public about his administration.”144 In particular, the
Court found:
133. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 549
(S.D.N.Y. 2018).
134. See id. at 550-553.
135. Id. at 550.
136. Id. at 550-551.
137. Id. at 551.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 552, 576; It is important to note that, in dicta, the court seems to assert that the act of
muting an account may not violate an individual’s First Amendment rights. Muting, instead of blocking
does not prohibit an account from replying to the President’s tweet, even when the reply is eventually
ignored. A muted tweet may be viewed and replied to by others, therefore, allowing the essential
interactive feature. Facebook also contains a similar function known as “unfollowing.” For more
information on “unfollowing,” see Facebook, How do I Unfollow a Person, Page or Group?, (2019),
https://www.facebook.com/help/190078864497547.
143. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d at 552, 576.
144. Id.
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President Trump uses @realDonaldTrump, often multiple times a day to
announce, describe, and defend his policies; to promote his
Administration’s legislative agenda; to announce official decisions; to
engage with foreign political leaders; to publicize state visits; to challenge
media organizations whose coverage of his Administration he believes to
be unfair; and for other statements, including on occasion statements
unrelated to official government business.145

Some announcements relating to official government business, in
particular the nomination of Christopher Wray for FBI director, and the
removals of then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and then-Secretary of
Veterans Affairs David Shulkin, were announced on @realDonaldTrump
before other channels of communication.146 President Trump’s account is
generally accessible to the public at large without regard to political
affiliation or other limiting criteria.147 The Court found that
@realDonaldTrump’s tweets typically generated thousands of replies,
favorites, and retweets.148
The plaintiffs in the case, Rebecca Buckwalter, Philip Cohen, Holly
Figuero, Eugene Gu, Brandon Neely, Joseph Papp and Nicholas Pappas,
each tweeted a message critical of the President in a reply to a tweet from
@realDonaldTrump.149 In response, the account blocked each of the
plaintiffs for their criticism of the President and his policies.150 While the
plaintiffs were blocked by @realDonaldTrump, the Court recognized that
the plaintiffs are not totally unable to interact with the President’s
tweets—for example they may create a second account to view the tweets
or they may view or reply to replies of the President’s tweet.151
After an overview of the plaintiffs and organization’s standing, the
Court analyzed whether the plaintiffs’ speech was protected under the
First Amendment, why the government speech exception is not invoked,
and how the forum doctrine applies under the circumstances.152
The Court found that the plaintiffs wished to engage in political speech
which “fall[s] within the core of First Amendment protection.”153 The
Court continued by noting that the plaintiffs’ speech did not fall within
the limited categories of speech outside the protection of the First
Amendment and instead fit squarely within the realm of protected

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 572.
Id. at 552-553.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Id.
See id. at 564, 572.
Id. at 565 (quoting Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 600 (2008)).
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speech.154
Next, the Court found that a forum analysis could be limited to certain
aspects of the @realDonaldTrump account, not the account as a whole.155
The Court did not suggest that plaintiffs should have access to the
@realDonaldTrump account as a whole, but acknowledged that the
interactive space of each tweet by the President is susceptible for the
forum analysis.156 The Court found that the content of the
@realDonaldTrump tweets was government speech because it met the
three prong test of Walker.157 However, the Court disagreed with the
Bevin court and found that the “interactive space for replies and retweets
created by each tweet” was not government speech and was instead the
private speech of the replying or retweeting user.158 The replies to
@realDonaldTrump’s tweets were not controlled by the account and they
were most directly associated with the replying user.159
Finally, the Court found that forum doctrine applied because the
interactive space associated with each tweet was government property,
and individual speech was consistent with the intended purpose of the
forum.160 The Court found that while Twitter was a privately-owned
company, the control exercised by the President amounted to government
ownership.161 Unlike ISKCON, the government property was more
metaphysical than spatial or geographic, but, like Rosenberger, that
distinction did not defeat a forum analysis.162 In addition, private speech
would not defeat the essential function of the forum.163 The interactive
space associated with each tweet could accommodate virtually an
unlimited number of replies and retweets and, as the Court recognized,
the essential function of the interactive space in the tweet was to allow
private users the opportunity to engage with @realDonaldTrump’s
speech.164
After concluding that a forum analysis was appropriate for the
interactive space of @realDonaldTrump’s tweets, the Court decided that
it was best classified as a designated public forum.165 The Court held that
the space was not a traditional public forum because there was no
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Id. at 565.
Id at 566.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 571.
Id. at 572.
Id.
Id. at 572-573.
Id. at 566-567.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 573.
Id. at 574-575.
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extended historical practice of using the interactive space of a tweet for
speech primarily because there was not an extended historical practice of
using Twitter or other social media.166 The Court concluded that the space
was a designated public forum because the government allowed anyone,
regardless of political affiliation, to access the tweets and used the tweets
“as a means through which the President ‘communicates directly with
you, the American people!’”167
Because the Court found that the interactive space created by the
President’s tweets was a designated forum, any restriction of speech was
only permissible if the restriction was narrowly drawn to achieve a
compelling state interest and did not engage in view-point or contentbased discrimination under the ISKCON standard.168 The Court found that
@realDonaldTrump’s blocking of users was impermissible viewpoint
discrimination primarily because the parties actually stipulated to the fact
that the users were blocked due to the viewpoints expressed in their
posts.169 Similar to the holding of Bevin, Trump argued that the President
retained a personal First Amendment interest in choosing the people he
associates with and that the individual plaintiffs had no right to have their
views amplified by the government.170 The Court responded by
recognizing that by blocking users on Twitter, the government went
beyond merely amplifying the voice of one speaker and instead actively
restricted the rights of individuals to advocate ideas.171 While injunctive
relief was requested by the plaintiffs, the Court concluded that a
declaratory judgement would likely achieve the same purpose172
IV. RE-APPLYING THE REHNQUIST APPROACH
This Part will analyze whether public officials who use social media,
in particular Twitter and Facebook, and block individuals while using the
166. Id. at 574.
167. Id. at 574 (quoting Stipulation ¶ 37).
168. Id. at 575.
169. Id. (citing Stipulation ¶ 53).
170. Id. at 575.
171. Id. at 576.
172. Id. at 579; President Trump appealed the District Court’s decision which was affirmed by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals on July 9, 2019. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v.
Trump, 928 F. Supp. 3d 226 (2d Cir. 2019). Similar to the Southern District of New York, the Second
Circuit focused on President Trump’s intent in operating the account, and how the features of Twitter
enabled users replying to the President to be heard by a wide audience. See Id. at 238. The Court rejected
President Trump’s argument that the speech may be controlled as government speech because the speech
in question concerned the speech of multiple users, not just the government. See Id. at 239. The Court
ended its opinion alluding to the marketplace of ideas rationale by reminding the litigants (and the public)
that the best response to disfavored speech on matters of public concern was more speech, not less. Id. at
240.
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platform limit speech in a way that violates the First Amendment. In
Section A, this Article will explain why the government speech exception
should not be invoked under these circumstances and why a political
solution is inadequate. In Section B, this Article applies the Rehnquist
approach to public fora to conclude that a public official’s use of social
media to disseminate information and connect with constituents should
constitute a designated public forum and therefore be subject to a strict
scrutiny analysis.
A. Blocking Individuals Does Not Invoke the Government Speech
Exception
In Bevin, the court did not analyze the blocking of individual users from
the Governor’s Facebook and Twitter because it found that the
government speech exception was invoked.173 The Bevin court
determined that because the public official was speaking for the
government, he was permitted to favor some speech over others.174 The
court decided that constituents unhappy with Governor Bevin’s use of
social media should seek a political solution rather than a legal one.175
While this analysis may be applicable to the content of the Governor’s
messages, invoking the government speech exception to individuals’
comments and replies is wholly inconsistent with the government speech
doctrine. The Bevin court argues that because the governor is using
Twitter and Facebook to communicate his own message, he is able to
curtail this message by silencing the speech of individuals wishing to
engage with his speech. The court fails to properly recognize that in reply
tweets and Facebook comments, there are clearly two independent
speakers engaged—the public official who wrote the tweet or post, and
the private individual engaging with the post. Applying the Pleasant
Grove test as interpreted in Walker, it is clear that the government speech
exception cannot apply to comments or replies to the social media post of
a public official.
In applying the Pleasant Grove test, a court should first look at whether
there is a history of government use of the medium to convey government
speech. Though the history is short, government officials have begun to
use social media extensively as a means of connecting with voters and
rationalizing political acts.176 But to say that there has been any history of
173. See Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1003, 1010-11 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
174. See id. at 1011.
175. See id. at 1013.
176. It would seem functionally inconsistent to claim that there is a long history of government
using social media in the government speech context, while discounting that same history in a traditional
public forum analysis when individual speech is involved. The court in Bevin, however, reasoned so.
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public officials managing the responses to their own messages would
directly contradict the purpose of the First Amendment and the
established history of its application. Individuals and organizations
responding to a Tweet or Facebook post cannot be considered government
speech in the same way that a news source’s criticism of a public official’s
action is not government speech. By blocking individual speech replying
to government announcements, a public official is significantly limiting
the marketplace of ideas as envisioned by Mill and the framers of the First
Amendment.
Second, the court should examine whether the speech is “often closely
identified in the public mind” with the government.177 Within the social
media arena, it would be functionally impossible for this prong to be met
because the limited speech is a reaction to government speech, not
government speech itself. Unlike Walker, where license plates were
closely associated in the public mind with government, an individual’s
private critique of government in the form of a social media post is not.
A reply tweet on Twitter is a unique message which features the replier’s
profile name and photo, while the original Tweet from a public official
features their own profile name and photo. Similarly, on Facebook a
comment features the commenter’s name and picture, while the original
post features the name and picture of the public official. The speech of
government and the response of the individual are not conflated as it was
in Walker where the message of the interest group appeared on the same
license plate as the state name. Therefore, it would be improper to claim
that a reply or comment to an original post, which is an independent
message, would be closely identified in the public mind with a
government official or government in general.
Third, the court should examine whether the government maintains
direct control over the messages conveyed. On Twitter and Facebook, a
public official is able to control the content of his or her own messages
but has no control over the reply or comments of individuals. Unlike
Walker, there is no government office that approves the comments or
replies of individual users on social media. The critical or supportive
tweets are not approved by an administrative office nor are they ratified
by the public official who initially tweeted.
While the content of a public official’s Tweets and Facebook posts
would clearly seem to invoke the government speech doctrine, applying
the doctrine to the replies and comments of private individuals is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Pleasant Grove
in Walker because (1) there is no history of blocking individuals as a

177. Walker v. Tex. Div. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2242 (2015) (quoting
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)).
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means of promoting a government’s message, (2) the speech is closely
identified with the individual commenter, not the government, and (3) the
government has no control over the messages conveyed in the replies or
comments.
B. The Interactive Space is a Designated Public Forum
First, a court using the Rehnquist approach of ISKCON should
conclude that the interactive space created when a public official posts on
social media is not a traditional public forum. Traditional public fora are
notoriously rigid, and the court must find that the government property is
“immemorially . . . held in trust for the use of the public . . . used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions,” in order to qualify as a public forum.178
Under this standard, it is highly unlikely that Twitter, Facebook, or any
other Internet forum would qualify as a traditional public forum. Despite
the extensive use of internet fora as a means of promoting political
objectives, there is not the same history associated with internet fora as
streets, parks, and other traditional public fora. Similar to the airport
terminals in ISKCON, social media is too modern of a development in
human history to qualify as a traditional public forum.
Continuing with the Rehnquist approach, a public official’s social
media post does create a designated public forum because when a public
official posts to social media, they are intentionally opening a space for
the purpose of public discussion and speech. Every tweet or post sent by
a public official is an individual outward act of opening a space for
discourse. When a public official posts she is not creating a public forum
by inaction, but is “intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for
public discourse.”179
In fact, Trump’s own rationale for creating a Twitter account was “as
a means through which the President ‘communicates directly with you,
the American people!’”180 The President set up his Twitter page for the
purposes of communicating with his electorate. A public official’s
affirmative act in creating a tweet goes further than mere acquiescence;
instead, it is an invitation for discourse which may not be rescinded
simply because the public official is unhappy with the response of the
constituents.
In addition, individuals’ speech on social media is not incompatible for
the purpose for which the forum was created because the forum was
178. Hague v. Comm. For Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
179. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985).
180. Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541, 574
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (quoting Stip, ¶ 37).
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created for communicative purposes. It would be logically incoherent to
conclude that a public official creating a social media account in order to
communicate with her constituents would have the purpose of the forum
compromised by communication. Nor is the number of speakers
problematic for the purposes of the forum analysis. Twitter and Facebook
are able to accommodate virtually an unlimited number of speakers; there
is no problem of some speakers frustrating the purposes of the forum.
Governor Bevin argued, and the Bevin district court agreed, that the
problem of spam made it necessary for a public official to maintain the
ability to silence commenters in order to use the pages for their intended
purpose. While this may be a valid concern, it can be cured through means
which do not violate the First Amendment as impermissible viewpoint
discrimination. A public official may use permissible content-based
restrictions in order to limit a class of speech as spam. If replies to a post
are truly off base to a point where they have no communicative value, a
public official may remove them as long as she does so regardless of
viewpoint.
If this standard was to be applied, however, it is not difficult to imagine
how a public official’s definition of spam may be politically motivated.
Consequently, it may be difficult to draw a bright-line rule with a contentbased restriction. However, with the mute function on Twitter and the
unfollow function on Facebook, a public official may essentially ignore
any individuals’ posts or comments on their tweet or post without
infringing upon their right to free speech. As the Bevin court correctly
described, “Governor Bevin is under no obligation to listen to Plaintiffs,
and Plaintiffs have no Constitutional right to be heard in this precise
manner.”181 But the right to be heard is not the same as the right to speak.
A public official may limit her own hearing of an individual’s free speech,
but she may not inhibit an individual from speaking once a forum has
been created.
In conclusion, when a public official intentionally opens a space online
for the purpose of facilitating communication, she has created a
designated public forum and may not limit speech based on viewpoint.
The act of creating this forum is intentional and the forum may support
an unlimited number of speakers without compromising the purpose for
which it was created. Spam can be addressed using permissible contentbased restrictions.

181. Hargis v. Bevin, 298 F. Supp. 3d 1002, 1011 (E.D. Ky. 2018).
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V. KENNEDY’S APPROACH AFFORDS BETTER PROTECTION TO INTERNET
PUBLIC FORA
The difficulties of categorizing and defining public fora, and
particularly internet fora, could be addressed by replacing Rehnquist’s
categorical analysis with Kennedy’s approach in ISKCON. Kennedy
believed that the “physical characteristics of the property at issue” and the
“actual public access and uses that have been permitted by the
government” should determine whether or not a particular space is
protected under a forum analysis.182 Kennedy believed that by looking at
how government property was similar to existing fora, how the fora was
actually used, and whether expressive activity would interfere with the
purposes of the property, courts could more accurately protect expression
on government property. Kennedy’s test provides flexibility for the
evolution of technological advances and future internet fora while
focusing on the actual uses of a forum rather than its uses in the past.
First, the Kennedy approach would allow for more flexibility in forum
analysis which is particularly useful in the internet age. By permitting a
court to analogize speech within a new space to existing fora, Kennedy’s
method is unlike Rehnquist’s approach in that it does not close the door
to the evolution of new spaces used primarily for speech. Rehnquist’s
categorical method will never afford the same protections to emerging
communicative spaces, such as airport terminals or social media, as those
provided to existing traditional public fora. Rehnquist’s method will
always disfavor new technologies and spaces simply because of their
recency. However, under Kennedy’s approach, if a court determines that
a new forum shares enough similarities with an existing forum, speech in
the space can be protected. Given the rapid rise of social media in the last
decade, it is impossible to predict what new platforms may emerge in even
the next five years. Given the recent history, however, one could safely
assume that public officials will use any emerging internet platforms as a
means of spreading their message and connecting with their constituents.
If government intends to continue to use social media as a means of
sharing its message, speech that disagrees with or challenges such action
must be permitted. The analogization exercise proposed by Kennedy will
give litigants the opportunity to argue that a new forum is similar to or
different from those fora already recognized. A judge can then assess the
arguments of both sides and use her discretion to determine whether or
not the forum is similar enough to existing ones to afford it special
protection. The analogization exercise of the Kennedy approach does not
foreclose the possibility of emerging fora and provides more flexibility in

182. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 672, 698 (1992).
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assessing the merits of the government property through its analogization
exercise.
Second, the Kennedy method focuses more on the actual uses of a
forum than its historical significance. Today, as more than 69% of
Americans use social media, the political speech presented in replies to
government posts should be more protected because of the popularity and
uses of the platforms. As more people use social media for the purposes
of political expression, traditional spaces for political expression are
being replaced with virtual ones. Public officials have recognized this
shift, and have begun to use social media sites in order to spread their
messages and connect with voters. By allowing and encouraging
interactive activity on social media sites, it is clear that public officials
have at least “acquiesced in the broad public access” to the property.183
Through the social media accounts of public officials like Trump and
Bevin, the government has intentionally opened virtual property for the
purposes of communicating and millions of Americans are taking the
opportunity to use the space for expression. By intentionally opening
government property for communicative purposes, the Kennedy approach
dictates that the interactive space on social media must be protected as a
public forum. The actual uses of government property should be more
dispositive than a historical analysis of the property. While history can
provide guidance and stability in a forum analysis, it can also hinder the
development and protection of new fora. If adopted, the Kennedy method
would allow government property that has been used for communicative
purposes to be protected as a public forum.
Third, Kennedy’s test would look at whether expressive activity would
undermine the purposes of the property as it was created. It is logically
incoherent to conclude that expressive activity in response to a public
official’s social media posts would interfere with the purposes for which
the property is used because the property was created for expressive
activity. The government cannot be permitted to open up virtual property
in order to communicate with constituents and then claim that the
communicative activity of those constitutes undermines the purposes of
the forum. By permitting expressive activity, the government is not
ratifying the speech of dissidents as their own. Public officials are not
even required to read or respond to that speech. But if a public official
opens up a virtual profile for the purpose of communicating with the
American public, pursuant to the First Amendment, they must be required
to allow expressive responses and not discriminate on the basis of
viewpoint.

183. Id. at 699.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The circuit split displayed by Bevin and Trump illustrates the difficulty
of applying Rehnquist’s categorical analysis to emerging internet fora.
Rehnquist’s analysis focuses on the historical attributes of a given forum
which leads to an inherently conservative application of the public forum
status. This approach does not consider the real uses of the space relating
to speech; instead, it protects government more than it ensures the
protection of speech. Nevertheless, the Court’s use of the Rehnquist
approach in Trump shows the approach’s potential for a more malleable
categorical method that could adapt to speech associated with new
technologies and spaces.
However, replacing Rehnquist’s approach with Kennedy’s approach
would provide more flexibility for the emergence of new public fora by
focusing on the actual uses of the forum rather than the historical
significance of a space. Kennedy’s approach would also better adhere to
the spirit and purpose of the First Amendment as described in Mill’s
marketplace of ideas. At their best, social media networks like Twitter
and Facebook can be used to debate political issues pulling from an
international range of perspectives and experiences. In fact, there is no
better place to engage in this political discussion than on a platform
intentionally opened up by a public official for the purposes of
announcing policy and defending political viewpoints. Dorsey’s vision of
Twitter as a virtual public square may be idyllic, but by properly
protecting speech in this narrow space and prohibiting viewpoint
discrimination, it could be realized.
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